Climate Change and Unrest in Syria

11/23/20224 min read

Mass anti-Assad protests erupted in Syria in 2011, sparked by the arrest and torture of fifteen boys who produced graffiti demanding a change of government (CFR 2021). More than 306,000 civilian lives have since been lost since the start of the conflict, which remains ongoing (UH OCHR 2022).

Climate change has been linked to the Syrian conflict. Kelley et al (2015) argue that, because anthropogenic interference in the climate system influenced long-term trends in decreased precipitation and rainfall, the drought in Syria from 2006-2009 was far more pronounced than it would have been by reason of natural variability alone. The authors draw support for their position from long-term trends in rainfall, temperatures, and sea-level pressures, as analysed in climate model simulations, climate theory, and previous literature.

According to Kelley et al (2015), existing insecurity in Syria of water resources, including a reliance on irrigation and groundwater, was exacerbated by unsustainable government policy which had the effect of depleting groundwater supplies and consequently led to a collapse of the agricultural and food systems. This collapse caused the internal displacement of about 1.5million people from rural farms as they migrated to urban peripheries, which were already under strain from the recent addition of approximately 1.5million Iraqi refugees (Kelley et al 2015). Kelley et al (2015) then claim that the final foundations for uprising in the cities were laid when the Assad government was unable to act quickly and effectively in quelling the discontent, which arose from the construction of illegal dwellings, lack of sound infrastructure, overcrowding, high crime and unemployment rates, corruption, and widespread socioeconomic inequality (Kelley et al 2015).

Rural and agricultural-dependent communities, especially livestock farmers, were most affected by the 2006-2009 drought. They lost their homes, lands, animals, and livelihoods, and became displaced within their own country.

In making the connection between climate change and political unrest, we face the problem of potentially discounting the crucial role played by existing political instability. While one cannot disregard the link between conflict and climate change, the link is indirect (UNFCCC 2022). More direct explanations for agitation can be found in the social and political history of the country.

It could be argued that the seeds of turmoil had been sown in Syria as early as 1923, when French control of Syria under a League of Nations mandate was met with resistance and insurgencies (UCA). After Syria declared independence in 1946 (UCA), and Israel declared independence in 1948 (The Knesset), 5 Arab states invaded Palestine (DOS) and Syria entered into a decades-long war which persists to this day. In 1970 Syria came under control of Hafez al-Assad who, in 1982, ordered the suppression of a Muslim Brotherhood uprising and killed more than 25,000 people (CFR 2021). Since then, there have been waves of demonstrations against the government controlled by al-Assad and subsequently his successor.

The influence of climate change, and the government’s response, can be said to have aggravated the dissatisfaction brewing in the Syrian political landscape, but there is a danger of disproportionately attributing unrest to climate change.

Per the critique by Selby et al (2017) of the 3 main articles underpinning the view that climate change contributed to the Syrian civil war, there is insufficient proof that human-induced climate change influenced the 2006-2009 drought, that drought in turn caused rural-urban migration of the alleged magnitude, and that the said migration contributed to the civil war triggered in 2011. According to Selby et al (2017), there is no scientific consensus on any connection between conflict and climate-related factors.

The statistical significance of the drought as claimed by Kelley et al (2015) is unconvincing -- their figures relate to the Fertile Crescent and not Syria specifically, the 3 papers contradict one other as regards the period of reduced rainfall, and the effect of the drought centred in northeast Syria and most of the country was unaffected (Selby et al 2017). Further, less than a quarter of the data examined by Kelley et al across the Fertile Crescent demonstrated a downward rainfall trend, and inter-annual variability does not appear to have been taken into account (Selby et al 2017).

According to Selby et al (2017), the scale of rural-urban migration claimed in the 3 papers is implausible. There has been no census on migrant numbers, and the figure of 1.5 million internally displaced peoples relied upon by Kelley et al (2015) appears to be supported by the statement of 1 Syrian government official who could well be referring to numbers of affected peoples (instead of displaced peoples) (Selby et al 2017). The 1.5million figure is also vastly different from the UN’s calculations as at 2009, based on data from the Syrian government, which describes ehe migration of 40,000 to 60,000 families (Selby et al 2017).

There were multiple other socio-economic elements which could have contributed to the uprising. Syria had been undergoing a process of liberalisation since the 1990s - which included, amongst others, removals of important fuel and fertiliser subsidies - there had been migration within and from rural regions prior to the 2006-2009 drought, and a late-winter frost in 2008 had decimated the wheat crop (Selby et al 2017).

Finally, Selby et al (2017 argue that the 3 articles do not demonstrate sufficient nexus between the drought migrants and the civil war of 2011. The evidence cited in these articles do not rely on academic literature, ethnography, interviews, or statistic correlation, nor do they discuss the various other population shifts from 2003 to 2010 (Selby et al 2017). The civil war could well be explained as having sprung from those population shifts in addition to growing resentment of a repressive government (Selby et al 2017).

Selby et al 2017 urges caution in conflating probability with determinism – even if anthropogenic climate change caused more frequent and intense droughts in Syria in general, it does not necessarily follow that it was an aggravating factor in the 2006-2009 drought in particular. The authors call for rigor and caution, given the difficulties in studying the effects of climate change in the political and socio-economic spheres.

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