Toward More Inclusive Distributive-Procedural Justice

The Rawlsian conception of distributive justice envisages that, in a mental exercise (the “veil of ignorance”) (Rawls 1971: 11) in which each party to the deliberation, hypothetically ignorant of their circumstances (Rawls 1971: 11), formulates principles of justice, it is likely that everyone would agree that each party is to have equal rights to certain basic political and economic liberties (Rawls 1971: 53).

Procedural justice can be interpreted as a refinement by Sen (2009) of Rawls’ theory, in that Sen highlights the challenges of “procedural parochialism” and the danger of partiality arising from provincial perceptions (Sen 2009: 150). In other words, even under the conceit of the theoretical constraints of the mental exercise, individuals are still prone to acting in accordance with their own “local group prejudices” (Sen 2009: 150).

I suggest that, when applied to environmental issues, Rawlsian distributive justice supports the argument that all countries regarding of their level of socioeconomic development ought to be imbued with the same rights and obligations; Sen’s qualification, expressed in the form of procedural justice, requires that more alternative views and “fresh wind from outside” (Sen 2009: 150) be considered in those deliberations.

There is a fundamental weakness in the idea that distribution ought to be equal.

Inequality amongst nations and individuals is a fact that cannot be ignored, mental exercise or not, and the assumption that all perspectives ought to have equal weight is deeply troubling, despite Rawls’ contention that the “veil of ignorance” mechanism is meant to symbolize “equality between human beings as moral persons” (Rawls 1971: 11).

Rawls supports his model with an example of a wealthy man and a poor man; in this example, he says that a person aware of their wealth may advocate against taxes to support welfare initiatives, while a person who knows they are poor may take the opposite position (Rawls 1971: 11).

It is challenging to accept that both points of view are equally correct or that both parties have, or ought to have, equal bargaining power. I suggest that there is inherent intragenerational justice in caring for the less advantaged; further, the cost to the poor of not having access to adequate welfare far exceeds the cost to the rich of paying somewhat higher taxes. Additionally, in response to the proposal that the “veil of ignorance” permits no individual to “win special advantages” (Rawls 1971: 130), it can hardly be said that it is a “special advantage” to have one’s state of poverty alleviated.

Forsyth (2014) argues generally that extant literature on distributive and procedural justice lacks focus on the framing of risks and solutions in the formulation of climate policies.

Specifically, the author calls for an examination into which voices contribute, and should contribute to, the deliberative process when defining environmental risks and solutions (Forsyth 2014: 231), given the disparate experiences of parties of climate change effects (Forsyth 2014: 230) and of the risks of proposed mitigatory and adaptive measures (Forsyth 2014: 232). For example, assertions about the agricultural sector posing dangers to nature fail to consider the benefits that agriculture offers to those reliant on it for livelihood and sustenance (Forsyth 2014: 231); further, current adaptation designs focus on ameliorating geophysical impacts without sufficient regard for development-led approaches toward reducing vulnerability (Forsyth 2014: 231).

From the perspective of countries in the global South and especially those located in environmentally vulnerable regions, the most urgent threats are in fact poverty and economic growth (Kartha et al 2005: 9). Indeed, climate solutions must not exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, nor should they invalidate a nation’s right to work toward economic development (Forsyth 2014: 231).

With reference to Forsyth’s statement that “more diverse values and priorities of affected people might influence what is seen as urgent” (Forsyth 2014: 232), I suggest that, if one considers more alternative viewpoints, it is likely that our understanding of climate impacts will expand from what is spotlighted in the mass media to include the lived experiences of hitherto less visible communities.

References:

• Forsyth, T. (2014). ‘Climate justice is not just ice’. Geoforum 54 2014, pp.230–232.

• Rawls, J. (1971). ‘A Theory of Justice’. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Sen, A. (2009). ‘The Idea of Justice’. Allen Lane, London.